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Abstract
The UK state pension (which depends only on age) includes an option
to defer take up which yields either a subsequent lump sum or higher
weekly pension. We analyse the joint decisions on pension deferral and
intertemporal labour supply/participation in a lifecycle setting. We show
that deferral is purely a ﬁnancial decision, but the impact of deferral
on work decisions depends on preferences, wage rates, non-labour income
and initial wealth. To exactly characterise this we use a quasilinear utility
function, and provide calibrated simulations. We also discuss the choice
between a lump sum or increased weekly pension.
JEL classiﬁcation: J14, J18, J22 & J26.
Key words: Retirement, Labour Supply, Ageing, UK State Pension.
1 Introduction
Aging populations and longevity raise issues regarding labour force participa-
tion rates, savings and pensions especially amongst the elderly. These are also
important issues for government ﬁscal balance since tax receipts, state pensions
and work conditional beneﬁts obviously vary with labour and capital incomes.
The aim of the state pension system in the UK is to alleviate poverty in old
age, Beveridge (1942), and in this sense it is a long term government commit-
ment. Governments respond by encouraging later retirement and/or raising the
age of eligibility for receipt of a state pension. All eligible state pensioners are
able to defer their pension for a period of time (in exchange for an increased
weekly pension when they do subsequently decide to claim), deferral does not
have to be linked with their labour market status although often is (Coleman
et al., 2008).
The possibility of State Pension deferral has implications for the planned
savings and work pattern of individuals through changing their lifetime pattern
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of non-labour income. What implications will deferral have for their work and
savings patterns? Can deferral induce individuals to stay on longer in paid
work? In this paper we formally analyse the joint deferral and intertemporal
labour participation decisions in a lifecycle setting.
The economic implications of ageing and increasing longevity has led to a
ﬂurry of research concerned with labour supply at or around retirement age
(see inter alia Meghir and Whitehouse,1997; Banks and Smith, 2006; Bloom,
Canning and Morre, 2014). Disney and Smith (2002) formally analyse the
eﬀect of the abolition of the Earnings Rule (which eﬀectively placed a very high
marginal tax rate on individuals who wanted to claim their pension and continue
working), and as a side issue also consider pension deferral. Their ﬁndings
suggest that after abolition, male weekly hours (above State Pension Age (SPA))
rose by approximately 4 hours, whilst for women it rose by 2 hours; however
Disney and Smith (2002) do not explicitly consider the eﬀects of pension deferral
on labour supply. Farrar et al (2012) compare the two deferral options available
under current State Pension legislation and conclude under most simulations
that the incremental option (additional weekly state pension) generally tended
to more lucrative.
With perfect capital markets we ﬁnd the deferral decision is independent of
preferences, wage rates or initial wealth. It is a purely ﬁnancial decision: choose
to defer if it raises the present value of non-labour income. However the eﬀect of
deferral on intertemporal labour supply does depend on preferences, wage rates
and initial wealth. In a general model we sketch the qualitative eﬀects but to get
analytical and empirically applicable results, we then specify preferences. After
deriving analytical expressions for the eﬀects on reservation wages for diﬀerent
intertemporal labour participation patterns, we calibrate these to compute the
size of the impacts. The present deferral scheme gives about a 2% increase in the
reservation wage for full time work for 12 months of deferral. If an individual
does defer, under the present system he can take the later rewards as either
a lump sum or as an increase in the weekly payment. We analyse the choice
between these, examining the eﬀects of life expectancy/length of deferral and of
interest rates.
In section 2 we lay out a general framework which encompasses the eﬀects of
pension deferral on optimal labour supply through the role of the present value
of non-labour income. In section 3 we show the eﬀects of regime switches on the
optimal labour supply, using a form of preferences used widely in the literature.
Section 4 compares the two deferral options available under current UK State
Pension legislation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
With perfect capital markets and in a world of certainty, ﬁnancial wealth can
be transferred intertemporally by the consumer. So one would expect that the
beneﬁts of deferring a state pension will depend only on a comparison between
the implicit interest rate used in the government set terms of deferral and the
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market interest rate. This is because individuals will only defer if it raises
their disposable wealth at the date of deferral, through raising the present value
of current and future non-labour income in the form of pension receipts. For
individuals who defer we would expect optimal adjustment in consumption c,
and leisure L as they intertemporally smooth the marginal utility of consump-
tion. There will be wealth eﬀects on present and future labour participation
and consumption. Disney & Smith (2002) point out that there may be labour
participation eﬀects of changes in the pension rules, or more speciﬁcally in the
implicit wage income an individual can earn in the absence of an earnings rule.
Without perfect and complete capital markets it is more complex. For example
with uncertainty about other future income sources and especially about the
remaining length of life, the decision to defer or not is much less clear.
Similarly individuals who face borrowing constraints are less likely to defer
when they have the opportunity. However a recent paper by Crawford and
O'Dea (2014) suggests credit constraints are unlikely to be in operation for
many older English households. Their paper using survey data from the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) linked to administrative data shows that
on reaching retirement 92% of their sample of older English households had a
level of total wealth in excess of what is optimal.1 Even if one were to exclude
housing wealth from observed wealth holdings, three quarters of the sample
had levels of wealth in excess of what is optimal. Indeed, many studies have
demonstrated the signiﬁcant wealth holdings of older households in developed
economies and suggest credit constraints are unlikely to be binding for such
households (see inter alia: Curme and Even, 1995; Wolﬀ, 1998; Scholz et al.
2004; Crook, 2006; Le Blanc et al. 2014).
To see how a decision to defer impacts on current and future labour supply
as individual leisure preferences and wage rates vary needs a formal framework.
We present this next. Our interest is on individuals at the end of their life,
so we take a two period model t = T − 1,T . There is a single ﬁnancial asset
A in which borrowing or saving is allowed and whose one period real interest
factor is r. The individual starts with a stock AT−1 of the ﬁnancial asset at the
beginning of period T-1. Each period the individual receives non-labour income
yT−1,yT part of which is pension receipts in the period. The pension receipts in
each period depend on the deferral decision. Individuals also have a ﬁxed time
endowment each period of one unit of time which can be used either for leisure
or work. To focus on labour participation we assume that the only work options
available are either L = 0 (full time work) or L = 1 (zero work).2 With these
assumptions wealth at the start of T − 1, xT−1, is
1Where optimal is deﬁned as maintaining a household's preretirement standard of living
through retirement.
2The fact we have considered corner solutions means there is the possibility for individuals
to move from retirement back into paid work, so called unretirement (Maestas, 2010). We
assume this is cost free however it could be argued this assumption is untenable. Individuals
may have to retrain and having been out of the labour this is more costly due to depreciation
in the individual's stock of human capital. Introducing a switching cost would imply an
individual's reservation wage increases ceterus paribus in order to account for the higher re-
entry cost. However it would not fundamentally change the main result of the paper.
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xT−1 = AT−1 + yT−1 +
yT
r
+ wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT (1− LT )
r
(1)
= YT−1 + wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT (1− LT )
r
Where YT−1 ≡ AT−1 + yT−1 + yTr . Individuals maximise a time additive
concave utility function which depends on a single consumption good, c, and
leisure L subject to their remaining lifetime budget constraint:
max
cT−1,cT ,LT−1,LT
u(cT−1,LT−1) + δu(cT , LT ) (2)
st cT−1 +
cT
r
= xT−1 (3)
0 ≤ Lt ≤ 1
where δ is the rate of time preference.
To highlight how deferral aﬀects lifetime utility, we solve the full lifecycle
problem in two steps: ﬁrst for a given deferral choice and given lifetime leisure
choices, we solve out the optimal lifetime consumption pattern. This gives us
a semi-indirect utility function in which maximal lifetime utility after adjusting
the consumption pattern depends only on the leisure choices and on initial
wealth xT−1 at time T-1.
Following this process, we substitute out the lifetime budget constraint re-
ducing the optimal consumption problem (for an interior solution) at ﬁxed values
of leisure and xT−1to
max
cT−1
u(cT−1, LT−1) + δu(r(xT−1 − cT−1), LT )
If we assume that consumption each period is interior, the ﬁrst order condition,
equation (3) below, shows that the marginal utility of consumption at each time
period must be intertemporally balanced:3
∂uT−1
∂cT−1
= rδ
∂uT
∂cT
(4)
(and given concavity in c this condition is also suﬃcient).
Lifetime wealth xT−1 depends on the deferral decision s=d,nd since this
partly determines income in each period via the pension. For ﬁxed values of
LT−1, LT and xsT−1 this gives a semi-indirect utility, v(.), deﬁned as:
v(LT−1, LT , xT−1) = maxcT−1 [u(cT−1, LT−1) + δu(r(x
s
T−1 − cT−1), LT )]
which is increasing in all its arguments and also concave in the leisures of each
period (see for example Stokey, Lucas, Prescott, 1989). The remaining problems
3Assuming that the marginal utility of consumption in any period becomes arbitrarily high
as consumption in that period becomes very small ensures an interior solution.
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for the individual are to choose optimal labour supply in each period and, via
deferral (Y s), xsT−1:
max
LT ,LT−1,xT−1
v(LT−1, LT , xT−1) st 0 ≤ Li ≤ 1
Our main focus is on the interaction between labour participation decisions,
saving and pension deferral so we focus on just full time and zero work options
for each time period.4 In the second step we jointly determine the best deferral
and leisure choice decisions, these decisions are discrete which implies compar-
ing semi-indirect utility function values for diﬀerent combinations of discrete
choices.
Should an individual defer their pension from T − 1to T? For any concave
increasing function v and for any values of LT−1, LT , v is maximised wrt xT−1
by choosing the highest value of xT−1. This is the best choice for any preferences
and any labour participation decisions that the indvidual chooses. Since capital
markets are perfect he can rearrange xT−1 through time in any way he wishes.
So if wage rates and preferences make it best to work only today he can save, or if
only tomorrow can borrow as he wishes. Recalling that xT−1 = 1, the individual
will choose the deferral option which has the higher present value of pension
payments which are embedded in Y. The state pension now available at T −1 is
p per period. Thus if the individual has non-state pension, non-labour income
(such as occupational pension income and investment income) of yoT−1; y
o
T then
without deferral they receive yT−1 = yoT−1+ p; yT = y
o
T + p. With deferral they
receive yT−1 = yoT−1; yT = y
o
T + rgp where rg is the implicit interest rate factor
set by the government in the terms of deferral. Deferral will be chosen iﬀ it
raises lifetime non-labour income Y = yT−1 + (yT /r). Without deferral Y nd =
y0T−1 + p+
[(
y0T + p
)
/r
]
while with deferral Y d = y0T−1 +
[(
y0T + rgp+ p
)
/r
]
.
Equating these two expressions implies that the individual is better oﬀ deferring
iﬀ rg > r. The implicit interest rate factor rg is common to all individuals so
variation amongst individuals in the decision to defer must be due to variation in
the market interest rate available to individuals, and more generally to variation
in borrowing constraints or other capital market imperfections, or to omitted
issues like uncertainty over the length of life or spousal labour force status.
Once derral has been decided, the remaining choices are labour participation.
There are four possible conﬁgurations of labour participation over the ﬁnal two
periods of life: full time work in both periods, zero work in both periods or full
time work in one period and zero work in the other.
Deﬁne the lifecycle full incomes at the start of T − 1 corresponding to each
lifetime pattern of labour participation (the subscripts refer to the amount of
4If we included interior solutions for labour participation there would be 9 conﬁgurations.
The way of getting the "reservation wages" above would be similar eg suppose 0 < LT−1 < 1
and LT = 0. Let L
∗
T−1 solve
dv(L∗T−1, 0, x)
dLT−1
= 0 and then require
dv(L∗T−1, 0, x)
dLT
< 0
See Appendix B for full details.
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leisure in each period so e.g. 01 corresponds to full time work at T − 1 but zero
work at T ) for a given pension deferral decision s = d, nd yielding Y s
Xs11 = AT−1 + Y
s ≡ Zs
Xs00 = AT−1 + Y
s + rwT−1 + wT = Zs + rwT−1 + wT
Xs01 = AT−1 + Y
s + rwT−1 = Zs + rwT−1
Xs10 = AT−1 + Y
s + wT = Z
s + wT
We have a ranking of the full incomes Xs00 > X
s
01 > X
s
11, X
s
00 > X
s
10 > X
s
11.
The possible payoﬀs corresponding to these labour participation patterns are
then v(1, 1, Xs11), v(0, 1, X
s
01), v(1, 0, X
s
10) and v(0, 0, X
s
00).Note that if v(1, 1, X
s
11) >
v(0, 1, Xs01), v(1, 0, X
s
10) then v(1, 1, X
s
11) > v(0, 0, X
s
00) from the monotonicity
of v() in all its arguments.
Given the deferral choice, the only diﬀerences in the full incomes between
participation patterns are in the value of the time endowment which arises in
periods of work and depends on the wages of those periods. A suitable idea of the
time proﬁle of reservation wages between any two alternative proﬁles of labour
participation, for a given deferral decision, is a pair wT−1, wT giving indiﬀerence
between the two patterns of labour participation. So with Zs = AT−1 + Y s,
and similarly for wages wswhere s = d, ndwe can deﬁne:
V s11 = v(1, 1, Z
s) = v(1, 0, Zs + ws,11,10T ) = V
s
10
V s01 = v(0, 1, Z
s + ws,01,10T−1 ) = v(1, 0, Z
s + ws,01,10T ) = V
s
10
V s11 = v(1, 1, Z
s) = v(0, 0, Zs + rws,00,10T−1 + w
s,00,10
T ) = V
s
00
V s11 = v(1, 1, Z
s) = v(1, 0, Zs + ws,11,01T−1 ) = V
s
01
⇒ v(0, 0, Zs + rwT−1 + ws,1110 ) < v(1, 0, Zs + ws,1110 )
In general ﬁnite positive wages ensuring these indiﬀerences exist if one as-
sumes the Inada conditions hold for ∂U∂L , however for certain forms of the utility
function (such as quasilinear) this is not true as we show in the next section.
Nonetheless the general pattern of how lifecycle labour participation is deter-
mined is clear. For the pattern ij to be optimal (i.e. participation state i in
period T − 1 and j in T ) to be optimal we require that V sij > V skl for each other
possible participation proﬁle kl. How the optimal participation proﬁle varies
with Z and current wages depends on the form of the utility. There are some
basic results just from monotonicity of v() in its arguments. Thus if V s11 = V
s
10
then V s00 < V
s
10. In general for a given Z and utility function, there will be a
region of high wages in both periods where it is optimal to work full time in
both periods (corresponding to V s00 > V
s
10, V
s
01, V
s
11). Similarly there will be a
region of low wages in both periods where it is not optimal to work in either
period (corresponding to V s11 > V
s
10, V
s
01, V
s
00). And ﬁnally there will be two
regions: one with high wages in T − 1 but low wages in T (corresponding to
V s01 > V
s
10, V
s
00, V
s
11), where it is optimal to work full time in T − 1 but not work
at all at T, and conversely a region of high wages at T but low wages at T − 1
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where it is optimal to stay out of the labour market at T − 1 but work full
time at T (corresponding to V s10 > V
s
00, V
s
01, V
s
11).With given preferences, Z and
wage rates of each period, the optimal proﬁle of labour participation for a given
deferral choice over the two periods is determined.
How does an improvement in the deferral option aﬀect the optimal participa-
tion proﬁle? Deferral is only taken up if it raises the present value of non-labour
income including the pension stream. This change in wealth changes the de-
mand for leisure in each period. If leisure is a normal good, an increase in wealth
increases the demand for leisure in each period. So we would generally expect
a drop in work hours in each period when an individual prefers to defer. If an
individual was planning full time work in each period in the absence of deferral
but chooses to defer, then if their wage rates were close to the reservation wage
in one of the periods (as computed above), with deferral his optimal proﬁle may
switch into zero work in that period. Disney and Smith (2002) consider the
eﬀects of relaxation of the earnings rule on labour supply participation of older
workers in the UK. Their empirical results indicate that increasing generosity
of work incentives, such as reducing the marginal tax rate on earnings for older
workers increases the number of hours worked.5 This suggests strong income
eﬀects are at work, whereas in our model deferral has a direct wealth eﬀect
and under standard assumptions would act to increase the amount of leisure
consumed.
To see the impact of pension deferral on lifecycle labour force participation
we need to know more about the wage regions corresponding to diﬀerent labour
participation patterns and how these vary with Z. To determine this we have to
resort to a speciﬁcation of preferences which allows us to explicitly compute the
labour participation areas and the ways in which they vary with Z. From this we
can predict which parts of the intertemporal wage rate distribution will lead to a
switch to zero hours of work in either or both of periods T−1, T on introduction
of the pension deferral option . We can then also see how deferral will impact
on consumption and savings in diﬀerent parts of the wage rate distribution.
3 Quasilinear utility.
In this section we take a commonly used speciﬁcation for the utility function
(Gustman and Steinmeier (2010), Blau (2012)), in which consumption, c, is
isoelastic and labour, L, is quasilinear. First we derive optimal saving and labour
supply regimes. We ﬁnd the channels through which pension deferral aﬀects
optimal labour supply. In this speciﬁcation, remaining lifetime preferences are
given by
u(cT−1,LT−1) + δu(cT , LT ) =
CαT−1
α
+ hT−1LT−1 + δ(
CαT
α
+ hTLT ) (5)
5This may not hold true for all workers depending on whether their income is above or
below the earnings rule threshold.
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In Appendix A we derive the savings function AT as
AT =
xT−1 − (δr)1/(α−1)(yT + wT (1− LT )
1 + r(δr)1/(α−1)
where now xT−1 ≡ AT−1 + yT−1 + wT−1(1− LT−1).
The resulting value function is:
v(Ks, wT−1LT−1, LT , wT ) =
(Ks + wT−1(1− LT−1)) + wT (1−LT )r )α
α
D+hT−1LT−1+δhTLT
where for a given deferral decision s = nd, d, Ks is the sum of the cumulated
value of initial wealth and lifetime non-labour income valued at T :
Ks ≡ r(AT−1 + yT−1) + yT
D ≡ ((δr)α/(α−1) + δ)
Ks varies with the deferral decision through varying lifetime non-labour
income but is otherwise exogenous.
The semi-indirect utility function v, is isoelastic in disposable wealth at
T − 1 and linear in present and future leisures. Quasilinearity in leisure given
the wealth eﬀect of pension deferral, means that the income eﬀects fall solely
on participation. In Appendix B we derive the full set of leisure demands for
these preferences with continuously varioable hours of work. However as stated
above our main interest is on the links between pension deferral and labour force
participation since in the context of extending working lives this is where the
main policy interest lies. Since we restrict attention to leisure choices which are
discrete (0, 1), then the best leisure/pension deferral combinations are given by
the maximal semindirect utility level over the discrete combinations of leisure
and deferral.
Conditional on deferral and hence Ks the maximal utilities obtained from
the lifecycle labour force regime (deﬁned by the subscript notation) are deﬁned
as:
V s00(K,wT−1, wT ) =
(Ks + rwT−1 + wT )α
α
D
V s01(K,wT−1) =
(Ks + rwT−1)α
α
D + δhT
V s10(K,wT ) =
(Ks + wT )
α
α
D + hT−1
V s11(K) =
(Ks)α
α
D + hT−1 + δhT
This allows us to deﬁne six combinations of wages ws,iT−1, w
s,i
T s = nd, d and
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i = 1..6 which give indiﬀerence between pairs of maximal utility levels
(1)V s00(K
s, ws,1T−1, w
s,1
T ) = V
s
01(K
s, ws,1T−1)
(2)V s00(K
s, ws,2T−1, w
s,2
T ) = V
s
10(K
s, ws,2T )
(3)V s00(K
s, ws,3T−1, w
s,3
T ) = V
s
11(K
s)
(4) V s01(K
s, ws,4T−1) = V
s
10(K
s, ws,4T ) (6)
(5) V s01(K
s, ws,5T−1) = V
s
11(K
s)
(6) V s10(K
s, ws,6T ) = V
s
11(K
s)
Using the detailed expressions for the various value functions Appendix C de-
rives the critical wage combinations and shows that generally they are related
as in Figure 1 below.6. Each of the lines labeled in Figure 1 correspond to
the reservation wages ws,iT−1, w
s,i
T giving indiﬀerence between pairs of maximal
utility levels.
Using monotonicity of the value function expressions in terms of the wage
rates, we can deduce regions of the wage space in which diﬀerent intertemporal
labour participation patterns are optimal as shown in Figure 2 below. The
boundaries between the regions in Figure 2 correspond to the relevant parts
of the lines in Figure 1: 1, 2 giving lower bounds on full time work, 5, 6 giving
upper bounds on the zero work region and 4 giving the division between working
either just in T − 1 or in T. Both Figures 1 and 2 are conditional on Ks and
therefore depend on the deferral choice.
3.1 The eﬀect of pension deferral on labour force partici-
pation.
To examine the impact of pension deferral which raises the present value of non-
labour income on lifecycle labour participation, we show how Figure 2 changes
with Ks. Figures 3 and 4 shows that the eﬀect on the optimal labour participa-
tion proﬁle of an increase in K depends on whether the utility value of leisure
is higher in T − 1 or T. In both cases the wage region with zero work in both
periods expands and that with full time work in both periods contracts. But
if the value of leisure is higher in period T than T − 1, the wage region with
full time work only at T − 1 expands at the expense of the wage region with
6In some cases there may be no positive wage pairs wT−1, wT yielding indiﬀerence. In case
(4) equating the expressions for v01 = v10yields the following equation:
(K + rwT−1)α = (K + wT )α +
α
D
(hT−1 − δhT )
If hT−1 − δhT > 0 this needs rwT−1 > wT ≥ 0: no intercept.
If hT−1−δhT < 0,then rwT−1 < wT . In fact if (K+wT )α+ αD (hT−1−δhT ) < 0 there is no
wT−1 ≥ 0 giving indiﬀerence (because the LHS must be > 0). But if ((K+wT )α+ αD (hT−1−
δhT ) > 0 then we must have wT > [− αD (hT−1−δhT )]1/α−K. If [− αD (hT−1−δhT )]1/α−K >
0 this gives a positive lower bound on (K+rwT−1)α of (setting wT = 0), Kα+ αD (hT−1−δhT )
which can be negative or positive. If [− α
D
(hT−1 − δhT )]1/α −K < 0 the lower bound on wT
is zero and then there is an intercept.
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Figure 1: Reservation wages which give indiﬀerence between pairs of maximal
utility levels
Figure 2: Optimal lifecycle participation proﬁles
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Figure 3: Increase in non-labour income hT−1 < hT
full time work only in T (as in Figure 3). Conversely if the value of leisure is
higher in T −1 than T, the wage region with full time work at T expands at the
expense of the wage region with full time work only in T − 1 (as in Figure 4).
If the option to defer is suddenly introduced or taken up, or is made more
generous, the present value of non-labour income increases. We can deduce the
likely eﬀects on lifecycle participation proﬁles. If leisure is more valuable in
period T − 1, the increase in K will tend to reduce full time work in T − 1.
A proportion of those individuals who were working full time in both periods
may switch to only working in period T and some of those who previously only
worked in T −1 may switch to only working in T. But some who previously only
worked in T may switch into inactivity in both periods. Thus with leisure more
valuable in T−1, the increase in the value of the deferred pension unambiguously
reduces the number of full time workers in T − 1, but may raise or lower it in
period T . If the value of leisure is higher in period T , the opposite eﬀects occur:
the number of full time workers in T unambiguously falls while the number of
full time workers in T − 1 may fall or rise depending on the distribution of the
lifecycle wages wT−1, wt in the population.
The wealth change caused by deferral has participation eﬀects on individuals
close to the reservation wage in one period at least. However labour force par-
ticipation is unaﬀected by the presence of pension deferral for those who earn
suﬃciently above the relevant critical wage deﬁning full time work. In the next
subsection we simulate the eﬀect of pension deferral implied by our framework.
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Figure 4: Increase in non-labour income hT−1 > hT
3.1.1 Stylised simulation: defer or not defer?
Having considered the theoretical eﬀects of pension deferral within our frame-
work, we demonstrate these eﬀects using a numerical simulation. In order to
calibrate our model we use a mixture of assumed parameters available in the
literature and those inferred from secondary data.
Following the work of Attanasio et al. (2008) we set the relative risk param-
eter α to −0.5. Using wave 4 (2012-2013) of the United Kingdom Household
Longitudinal Survey we estimate median per capita (non-housing) wealth of
¿1500. Using the 2013-2014 UK Family Resources Survey (UKFRS) we esti-
mate median weekly investment income (among individuals aged 65 and over) to
be zero. The UKFRS also contains information on weekly private/occupational
pension income, the median ﬁgure among all individuals aged 65 and over is
¿32. Finally we assume weekly state pension income to be ¿125.7 We also
assume individuals work 40 hours per week, can earn an annual rate of return
of 3% in the free market and have a time preference discount rate of 0.95. If
an individual defers their state pension they can earn an annual rate of return
of 10.4 (equivalent to a weekly rate of 0.2%), this is equal to the rate of re-
turn available to individuals under current government legislation. We set the
marginal value of leisure h in the penultimate period and terminal period at
0.006 and 0.00630 respectively (an increase of 5% between periods).8 In doing
7State pension income could also include beneﬁts such as pension credit and other supple-
mentary state beneﬁt income sources.
8This value generates an optimal labour income/asset ratio of about 30%, a reservation
wage for zero work at a level similar to the UK Minimum Wage/ UK Living Wage and a
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Figure 5: Wage co-ordinates deﬁning zero and full time work
so we replicate the eﬀects of Figure 3 more clearly i.e. assuming hT−1 < δhT as
shown in Figure 5.
We provide a sketch of how the simulations are performed. First, we deter-
mine the wages deﬁning indiﬀerence between the various labour supply regimes
in (1) − (6) above. Next, using the assumed/inferred parameters we implic-
itly plot these indiﬀerences, as shown in Figure 5. Our focus is on zero and
full time work, therefore we compute the wage coordinates which correspond to
these regimes being optimal. We carry out this exercise assuming no deferral
and then repeat it assuming an individual does defer their state pension. We
assume individuals defer their pension for one period and earn 10.4% rate of
return on the missed state pension payment as per current UK legislation. In
this way, we are able to plot the areas of diﬀerent types of labour participation,
with and without deferral, and hence show the eﬀects of state pension deferral
on labour supply.
By deferring one period the reservation wages required to be in a given
labour supply regime increase in each period. In the case of zero work this is
shown by the curves shifting from point A to point B, whereas for full time work
the corresponding loci shifts from point C to point D. Under the no deferral
option the wage rate required to be in zero work at T − 1, T is (¿6.69,¿6.87)
respectively, whilst under deferral it rises to (¿6.81,¿6.99). Similarly for full
time work at (T − 1, T ) the corresponding wage rates are (¿9.07,¿8.82), under
deferral these increase to (¿9.25,¿9.01). The eﬀect of pension deferral therefore
critical wage for switching from part-time to full time of about one and a half times the
National Minimum Wage.
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raises the full time reservation wage by around 2% assuming the above param-
eters. How sensitive are our results to changes in the assumed parameters? It
turns out that the two parameters which change the critical wage combinations
most signiﬁcantly from the benchmark example above areα, the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion and h the marginal value of leisure in each period. Other
parameters such as AT−1, yt−1, yt raise and lower the wage combinations in a
predictable way, for example an increase At−1will raise reservation wages for all
labour supply combinations. That is to say, these parameters do not aﬀect the
shape of the wage curves as deﬁned in Appendix C.
To demonstrate the sensitivity of our results, Table 1 shows the wage co-
ordinates deﬁning zero work in each period
(
¿w11T−1,¿w
11
T
)
and the wage rate
deﬁning full time work
(
¿w00T−1,¿w
00
T
)
when αand h are (separately) altered
from baseline (cases 1 and 4 in Table 1 refer to Figure 5). For each case note
there are two rows, the top row refers to the situation where the individual does
not defer their state pension and the second row refers to the situation when
they do defer their state pension. The column PV (¿Y ∗) denotes the present
value of total pension non-labour income (the sum of state and private pension);
when an individual does not defer (the top row of each case) then Y ∗ is equal to
¿157 in T-1 and T (total: ¿314). If instead he/she chooses to defer then Y ∗is
equal to ¿32 in T-1 and ¿307 in T (total: ¿339).9 The present value of the
two amounts (no defer and defer) is equal to ¿309.4 and ¿330.05 respectively
therefore in every case the individual is better oﬀ deferring.
9These numbers are derived as follows: No deferral case Y ∗=weekly state pension (¿125) +
weekly private pension (¿32), which is equal to ¿157 in each period (total ¿314). In the defer
case, Y ∗=weekly private pension (¿32) in T-1 and then at T the individual receives their
deferred state pension*(1 + rdefer) +weekly state pension+ weekly private pension (¿32)
(total ¿X).
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Table 1: Changes in αand h on wage co-ordinates deﬁning
zero and full time work relative to Figure 5.
Case Defer? α PV (¿Y ∗) ¿w11T−1,¿w
11
T ¿w
00
T−1,¿w
00
T
1 No -0.5 309.4 6.69, 6.87 9.07, 8.82
1 Yes -0.5 330.05 6.81, 6.99 9.25, 9.01
2 No -0.45 309.4 4.43, 4.54 5.34, 5.20
2 Yes -0.45 330.05 4.50, 4.62 5.44, 5.30
3 No -0.55 309.4 10.32, 10.59 18.40, 17.90
3 Yes -0.55 330.05 10.51, 10.80 18.88, 18.37
hT−1, hT
4 No 0.006,0.0063 309.4 6.69, 6.87 9.07, 8.82
4 Yes 0.006,0.0063 330.05 6.81, 6.99 9.25, 9.01
5 No 0.008,0.0084 309.4 9.26, 9.50 14.65, 14.26
5 Yes 0.008,0.0084 330.05 9.42, 9.68 14.99, 14.58
6 No 0.004,0.0042 309.4 4.31, 4.42 5.20, 5.06
6 Yes 0.004,0.0042 330.05 4.38, 4.50 5.30, 5.16
Tilting the marginal value of leisure in T − 1and T (assuming α = 0.5)
hT−1
hT
7 No 0.95 0.006,0.0063 6.69, 6.87 9.07, 8.82
7 Yes 0.95 0.006,0.0063 6.81, 6.99 9.25, 9.01
8 No 1 0.006,0.006 6.69, 6.51 8.56, 8.70
8 Yes 1 0.006,0.006 6.81, 6.62 8.73, 8.88
9 No 1.05 0.0063,0.006 6.69, 6.15 8.06, 8.58
9 Yes 1.05 0.0063,0.006 6.81, 6.26 8.21, 8.75
Notes:In cases 1-6 we assume rriskfree = 1.03,rdefer = 1.104 ,δ = 0.95, AT−1 = 1500,
hT−1 = 0.006, hT = 0.0063 and individual works 40 hours per week. Y is deﬁned
as the sum of non-pension investment income, private/occupational pension income
and state pension income. wyxcorresponds to the wage in period x where x(T − 1, T )
and y corresponds to the labor supply regime where y(nowork(11), alwayswork(00)).
Cases 1-3 of Table 1 shows how small changes in the coeﬃcient of relative
of risk aversion, α, can signiﬁcantly change the wage co-ordinates deﬁning the
reservation wages for zero and full time work. Case 2 in Table 1 indicates
individuals who are less risk averse (α = −0.45) have a lower reservation wage
relative to the benchmark (α = −0.5). On the other hand individuals who are
more risk averse (α = −0.55) have a signiﬁcantly higher reservation wage.
Now consider the eﬀect of changing the marginal value of leisure, case 4
(hT−1 = 0.006, hT = 0.0063) is the benchmark case (demonstrated graphically
in Figure 5). Increasing an individual's marginal value of leisure in each period
(case 5: (hT−1 = 0.008, hT = 0.0084)), intuitively should raise an individual's
reservation wages for both not-working and working full time. Next, consider
reducing an individual's marginal value of leisure (case 6: (hT−1 = 0.004, hT =
0.0042)), this reduces an individual's reservation wage from the benchmark case.
It is worth noting our benchmark example gives a zero work reservation wage
close to UK National Minimum Wage and National Living Wage. Implicitly in
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the calibration the change in reservation wage on deferral is for deferral lasting
one year.
Cases 7-9 analyse the eﬀects of varying the ratio of the marginal value of
leisure in T − 1 and T. Case 7 is the benchmark case where the marginal value
of leisure is higher in T than T-1. In case 8 there is no change in the marginal
value of leisure, consider the column showing the reservation wages for zero
work (¿w11T−1,¿w
11
T ) the impact (relative to case 7) is that the period T wages
for zero work are now lower (irrespective of whether an individual defers or
not). Similarly the change in hT−1hT also aﬀects the wage co-ordinates deﬁning
the full time reservation wages (see column ¿w00T−1,¿w
00
T ), in this case all the
wage co-ordinates are lower than the benchmark example. Finally, in case 9 an
individual's marginal value of leisure decreases between T-1 and T, similar to
case 8 this reduces the reservation wage deﬁning zero work in T and also the
wage co-ordinates deﬁning full time work (again, the direction of the eﬀect is
the same irrespective of whether an individual defers or not). A priori it is not
clear how an individual's marginal value of leisure will evolve at or around SPA,
for example it could be related to complementarities in leisure or exogenous
shocks to one's health; however what is clear is that in a quasilinear framework
as per (5) this parameter has important implications for the reservation wages
deﬁning zero and full time work.
It is important to note that the decision to defer state pension is optimal
irrespective of changes to key parameters used in the simulation. Moreover, as
the period of deferral increases beyond this, the reservation wage diﬀerence will
rise. How the relative slopes of the participation regime boundaries and their
position change principally depends on the change in the value of non-labour
income by deferring and the diﬀerence in the marginal value of leisure in each
period.
Empirical relevance of pension deferral. The stylised simulation showed
that in the baseline example (case 1) deferral can aﬀect labour supply decisions
for all full time workers who earn more than approximately £9 per hour. We
pool four waves of data from the Labour Force Survey between the years 2008
and 2013 to determine the wage distributions (conditional on being in work) for
women aged between 60 and 65, and men aged between 65 and 70.10 We restrict
our sample to these age ranges as they cover the state retirement age and hence
the period when individuals make the deferral decision. It is important to note
that the decision to work and the deferral decision are independent (except for
the implications on income tax). Our ﬁnal sample consists of 483 individuals
and Figures 6 and 7 depict their hourly wages.
It is clear that a signiﬁcant proportion (around 54% of females and more
than 62% males) in our sample earn more than £9 per hour, therefore deferral
10We ensure there is no overlap in the surveys to ensure our sample does not contain any
repeated observations. We include individuals working below full time hours to boost sample
size, noting that the mean wage for full time and part time workers in this age category are
roughly equal.
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Figure 6: Female Wage Distribution: Ages 60-65 (2008-2013)
Figure 7: Male Wage Distribution: Ages 65-70 (2008-2013)
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policy is an important component of the labour supply decision for a large
proportion of older workers. Indeed a DWP report in 2008 suggested that
individuals tend to coordinate their labour supply and deferral decision. They
found 79% of deliberate deferrers were in paid work and tended to maintain
their preretirement hours, primarily full time, after deferral. Family decisions
were important so a partner continuing in work made deferral more likely, as
did the desire to avoid liability for a higher income tax rate. Under current
UK legislation there are actually diﬀerent dimensions to the deferral choice: to
opt for an enhanced weekly pension or a lump sum payment on undeferral and
conditional on deciding to defer, for how long to do so. With a two period
model these diﬀerences do not matter. But with increased longevity, deferral is
increasingly common and so these details of the deferral scheme are important
for both the government and the individual.
4 UK State Pension & Deferral.
4.1 Which Deferral Option is Best
In a multiperiod setting the decision becomes one of choosing both if to defer
and, if so, for how many years. In this section we simulate the present value
of an individuals state pension pot at the date of undeferral, under both the
incremental and lump sum option for deferral over a varying number of years.
In our comparisons we purely compare deferral options based on the present
net value under current government legislation, we do not use the theoretical
framework developed in earlier sections of the paper.
On reaching SPA an individual can choose whether to take up the state
pension or defer it from that date. They do not have to precommit to a length of
deferral but at any future date can ask for their pension to start from then on.11
If an individual chooses to defer their pension, then current rules mean that for
every ﬁve weeks an individual defers, their weekly State Pension increases by
1%, this is equivalent to a 10.4% rate of return for each full year of deferral.
Alternatively an individual may also defer their State Pension and receive a lump
sum payment.12, 13 If an individual chooses to take the latter option, the lump
sum they receive is the value of their past deferred weekly pension payments
accumulated at an interest rate of at least 2% above the Bank of England
11This not true for the lump sum option, in which case the individual must defer for at least
52 weeks.
12Extra State Pension and lump sum payment are both taxed. In addition if you choose
to defer then this will impact means tested beneﬁts, whereas if you choose to recieve a lump
sum, this will not aﬀect certain means tested beneﬁts.
13Since it's inception there have been various changes to legislation regarding how the rate
of return on the deferral option is formulated, and the introduction of the lump sum option
in 2006. For a more detailed description of these changes see Bozio et al (2010).
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base rate. 14,15 If an individual chooses to take the latter option, the lump
sum they receive is the value of their past deferred weekly pension payments
accumulated at an interest rate of at least 2% above the Bank of England base
rate.16 Depending on the life expectancy of the individual there is no clear
answer as to which option is more lucrative, however given the increasing life
expectancy observed in the past 30 years, it is generally considered (see Farrar
et al., 2012) that the incremental option oﬀers a higher rate of return.
At the point of reinstatement of a deferred pension S, the present value of the
extra weekly payment coming from the deferral is x(1+1.01+1.012+..1.01τ )(1+
(1+r)−1+ ..(1+r)T−S) where τ is the number of months for which the pension
has been deferred between SRA and age at S, x is the original weekly pension
payable at SRA, r is a constant market interest rate and T is the date of death.
On the other hand the lump sum payable at S is x(1+1+ρ+(1+ρ)2+..(1+ρ)τ )
where ρ is at least 2% above bank base rate.
We plot the present value under each option in Figures 8 and 9 below. In
Figure 8 we vary the generosity of the incremental option, i.e. the length of time
it takes to earn a 1% increase in an individuals weekly state pension. Whilst in
Figure 9 we vary the length of the period from the date of undeferral to death.
It is these two factors which to a large extent dictate the PV of the deferred
pension. To show this we set all other parameter values as follows: initial weekly
state pension of ¿125, weekly interest rate on lump sum option equal to 0.0552 ,
post undeferral weekly net rate of return equal to 0.0252 and deferral period equal
to two years. We set the lump sum weekly interest rate equal to 0.0552 using the
current policy rule that for the lump option of deferral, beneﬁts will grow at 2%
per annum above the Bank of England base rate.17
(i) Varying rate of return on incremental option Figure 8 shows
the eﬀect of changing the rate of return or relative generosity, assuming an
individual lives for 15 years following the date of undeferral. The sloping curve
represents the deferred income option whilst the ﬂat curve corresponds to the
lump sum option.
The break even of point for the PV of the pension is at a rate of return
of about 1% for every 6.25 weeks deferred. Under existing rules the current
rate of return is a 1% increment for every 5 weeks deferred, and therefore in this
14In terms of pension deferral one of the biggest changes of the move to a single tier pension
is that the lump sum option will be scrapped and only the incremental option will be available
to those who defer (White Paper 2013). Moreover the incremental option will become less
generous providing deferrers with a rate of return of just under 5.8%.
15Extra State Pension and lump sum payment are both taxed. In addition if you choose
to defer then this will impact means tested beneﬁts, whereas if you choose to recieve a lump
sum, this will not aﬀect certain means tested beneﬁts.
16In terms of pension deferral one of the biggest changes of the move to a single tier pension
is that the lump sum option will be scrapped and only the incremental option will be available
to those who defer (White Paper 2013). At the time of writing the actual generosity of the
incremental option is yet to be decided, however is believed to be in the region of half its
current generosity (FT, September 2013).
17Bank of England historical data between 2005-2009 (prior to the ﬁnancial crisis) reveals
the average interest rate was roughly 3%.
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Figure 8: Varying the contribution factor
Notes: The X-axis measures the number of weeks (multiplied by 100) required for an individual
to defer their state pension in order for them to receive an additional ¿1 extra a week upon
undeferral.
example it is worth approximately ¿3000 to the individual to choose the deferred
income option. However if the individual was credit constrained then it could
be the case they require the lump sum to clear some debt, e.g. an outstanding
mortgage. What is also clear is that during the 1970's when the contribution
rate was approximately 1% for every 7-8 weeks deferred, and individuals had a
shorter life span (see Figure 10), the lump sum option would have been more
lucrative had it been available. As of April 2016 the government plans to scrap
the lump sum option and reduce the generosity of the incremental option by
one-half which implies individuals will be worse oﬀ; however the proposed rate
of return on the incremental option is still in excess of the free market rate.
(ii) Varying life span from undeferral date Figure 9 shows the eﬀect
of increasing longevity under the incremental option (green) and lump sum
option (red), assuming parameters of the current legislation.
Intuitively, those who only live a short period after they undefer are much
better oﬀ choosing the lump sum option. However it is clear that the deferred
income option is more lucrative provided an individual lives for approximately
12 years or more after they undefer.
The Oﬃce for National Statistics (2011) published current and projected life
expectancy tables by gender in the UK covering the period 1985 to 2035. Over
this period it is quite clear life expectancy has increased substantially, for both
cohort and period groups. Period life expectancy refers to the life expectancy for
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Figure 9: Varying individuals life expectancy
Notes: X-axis refers the duration (in weeks) of the deferral period.
those individuals in a given calender year (ONS, 2011). Hence in 2013 females
are expected to live until 83 years of age on average. In contrast, cohort life
expectancy at birth is calculated using age-speciﬁc mortality rates which allow
for known or projected changes in mortality throughout a person's life (ONS,
2011). For example a female born in 2013 is expected to live until 94 years of
age.
Supposing an individual reaches their life expectancy, Figure 10 implies the
deferred income option is more lucrative for both current and future retirees, so
long as the relative generosity of this option is not changed.
Farrar et al. (2012) compare the two undeferral options relative to not
deferring and investing at the market rate, in most policy simulations deferral
of any kind is preferred over non deferral.18 Similar to Disney and Smith (2002)
and our own model, Farrar et al. (2012) assume individuals face no borrowing
constraints. Deferral would not be optimal if individuals could not borrow
against their future income. Assuming an individual reaches their predicted life
expectancy, then our results imply the incremental option tends to oﬀer a higher
rate of return in most of the simulations. Similarly Farrar et al. (2012) ﬁnd
the 10.4% interest payment substantially exceeded the break even interest rate
required for the incremental and lump sum option to be of equal value (in PV
terms).
Coleman et al (2008) analyse the characteristics of deferrers versus those
18In their paper the authors worked in continuous time and do not consider a formal model
of labour force participation.
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Figure 10: Cohort and period life expectancy men and women
Source: ONS (2011)
who claim state pension at SPA. Their results suggest deferrers are mainly
high earners who had good ﬁnancial knowledge of the deferral option (hence
the majority of them chose the deferred income option) and either they or their
partner tended to continue engaging with paid work post SPA. These individuals
reported they were ﬁnancially comfortable during the deferral period. This
suggests the employment and deferral decision may well be jointly determined
and it is unlikely deferrers are from credit constrained households. More recent
data from waves four and ﬁve of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA) spanning the years 2008-2013 also contain information on state pension
deferral, despite small sample sizes those who do defer tend to have worked in
professional, managerial or skilled non-manual occupations. These individuals
are more likely to choose the incremental income option and tend to defer their
state pension for between 1 and 5 years.19
4.2 Prevalence of pension deferral.
A Freedom of Information Request released by the DWP showed between Septem-
ber 2009-2010 approximately 66,300 individuals deferred their pension.20 Of this
total roughly just over one third took the increment option, whilst nearly half
19Occupation data is fed forward to wave one of ELSA from the Health Survey for England
data, from which the original ELSA sample is derived.
20Freedom of Information request catalogue number (2773/2011).
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took the lump sum option, the remainder took a mixture of the two.21 Of the
total number of individuals eligible to claim their state pension, roughly 1 in
10 chose to defer their pension. Coleman et al (2008) using administrative data
surveyed individuals who were approaching or had reached SPA, and found only
a low level of respondents, 65%, knew of the option to defer. This proportion
only increased slightly after SPA. The main reasons cited were due time con-
straints and it being the `spouses responsibility', lack of interest or conﬁdence
in ﬁnancial matters. Therefore despite roughly 1 in 10 individuals deferring it
is likely with increased awareness (a central aim of the 2013 White Paper) this
proportion will rise.22
5 Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper we develop a lifecycle framework to model the joint decision of
pension deferral and intertemporal labour supply. Contrary to the policy aim of
pension deferral which is to extend working lives, our theoretical model indicates
pension deferral acts to raise the reservation wage and reduce the likelihood of
labour force participation. The exact direction in which labour force changes in
a two period framework depends on the marginal value of leisure in each period
and its change over time. There are clear qualitative eﬀects, depending on wage
proﬁle, non-labour wealth and preferences, introduction of a pension deferral
scheme can tilt labour participation towards the present or future.
Our numerical simulation and empirical evidence suggest that the deferral
policy aﬀects a large proportion of the older working population. As a ballpark
ﬁgure the option changes the reservation wages by about 2%. Moreover similarly
to Farrar et al. (2012) our results indicate (1) pension deferral is optimal in
the absence of credit constraints and (2) of the deferral options available, the
incremental income option is more lucrative.
The recent UK announcement of a move to a single tier pension system will
have a number of ﬁnancial implications for those approaching retirement and
future generations (Crawford et al., 2013). This includes changes to the rules
governing pension deferral, the most signiﬁcant of which relate to the abolition
of the lump sum option and reduction in the generosity of the incremental option
(the implied annual interest rate on deferrals will halve from 10.4% to 5.8%).
Nonetheless this is still far in excess of other tax eﬃcient ﬁnancial products
commonly available, including the Pensioner Bond launched in December 2014.
21FOI DWP (2011) pp.2 notes: New rules for deferral came into eﬀect in April 2005 and
lump payments became available from April 2006. A person who deferred their State Pension
before April 2005 would qualify for increments for the period up to April 2005 and may have
a choice of either a lump sum payment or an increment for the period of deferral from April
2005. This means some people may have both an increment and a lump sum payment. The
lump sum option is only available to those who have deferred continuously for at least 12
months. The numbers do not include those who deferred for less than 12 months and opted
for simple arrears instead of increments.
22Options to allow increased ﬂexibility of deferring and undefering multiple times are also
being considered by the DWP (White Paper 2013).
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At present one in ten retirees chooses to defer their state pension; policymak-
ers are attempting to design various initiatives to extend working lives in the
face of increasing life expectancy. Therefore research which attempts to under-
stand the eﬀects of pension deferral from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint
is of paramount importance.
We have simpliﬁed the framework to highlight the key factors. Of course
relevant extensions are possible. Above we have considered a single individuals
choice. In the aggregate any change in total pension cost to the government
would have to be ﬁnanced, it could thus go hand in hand with a wage tax on
all workers both elderly and others. If deferral is less costly to the exchequer
then the wage tax could be lower and consequently the regions in which wages
are above their reservation levels might expand. Moreover if there are many
individuals who all choose to defer and this reduces their labour supply, then
through the fall in aggregate labour supply, worker productivity and so pretax
wage rates could rise. We have simpliﬁed away these feedback eﬀects.
Another relationship we have not considered is the established link between
health and age. If in poor health at T-1, the demand for lesiure and conm-
sumption at T-1 is likley to increase making deferral less likely. On the other
hand if in good health at T-1 but with the risk of facing poor health at T and
its associated expenses, the demand for leisure and consumption at T-1 may
fall and that for deferral increase. Therefore the net eﬀect on labour supply is
ambigious.
Finally we have assumed uncertainty away. This could impact through sev-
eral channels: the life expectancy, the future non-labour income and the future
wage rate.
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A The Semi-Indirect Utility Function for Quasilinear-
Isoelastic Preferences
Deﬁning AT as the ﬁnancial wealth carried forward from period T −1 to period
T, we can substitute out the lifetime budget constraint to write cT−1 in terms
of initial wealth minus savings and leave the problem
U =
(AT−1 + yT−1 + wT−1(1− LT−1)−AT )α
α
+ hT−1LT−1
+δ(
(rAT + yT + wT (1− LT ))α
α
+ hTLT )
Maximising U wrt AT gives
AT =
xT−1 − (δr)1/(α−1)(yT + wT (1− LT )
1 + r(δr)1/(α−1)
where xT−1 = AT−1 + yT−1 + wT−1(1 − LT−1) and putting this back into U
gives
U =
(AT−1 + yT−1 + wT−1(1− LT−1)−
[
xT−1−(δr)1/(α−1)(yT+wT (1−LT )
1+r(δr)1/(α−1)
]
)α
α
+ hT−1LT−1
+δ(
(r
[
xT−1−(δr)1/(α−1)(yT+wT (1−LT )
1+r(δr)1/(α−1)
]
+ yT + wT (1− LT ))α
α
+ hTLT )
The semi indirect utility function is then
v =
(r(AT−1 + yT−1 + wT−1(1− LT−1)) + yT + wT (1− LT ))α
α
((δr)α/(α−1) + δ)
+hT−1LT−1 + δhTLT
which can be rewritten as
v =
(Ks + rwT−1(1− LT−1)) + wT (1− LT ))α
α
D + hT−1LT−1 + δhTLT
where:
K = r(AT−1 + yT−1) + yT , D = ((δr)α/(α−1) + δ)
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B Leisure Demands with Continuous Hours
Consider the value function assuming a quasilinear speciﬁcation for utility:
v =
1
α
[Ks + wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT
r
(1− LT )]αD + hT−1LT−1 + δhTLT
D = ((δr)α/(α−1) + δ
First order conditions wrt LT−1, LT are
∂v
∂LT−1
= hT−1 −DwT−1[Ks + wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT
r
(1− LT )]α−1
∂v
∂LT−1
= hT −DwT
r
[Ks +
wT
r
(1− LT−1) + wT
r
(1− LT )]α−1
which can be written
∂v
∂LT−1
: (
hT−1
DwT−1
)1/(α−1) − [Ks + wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT
r
(1− LT )]
∂v
∂LT−1
: (
rδhT
DwT
)1/(α−1) − [Ks + wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT
r
(1− LT )]
We have the constraints 0 ≤ Lt ≤ 1, t = T − 1, T. The combinations of possible
solutions are
(1) if (Ks+wT−1+ wTr )
α−1 < ( hT−1DwT−1 ) and (K
s+wT−1+ wTr )
α−1 < ( rδhTDwT ),
at zero leisure each period the marginal utility of leisure exceeds the marginal
utility of consumption so optimally (LT−1, LT ) = (0, 0)
(2) if
(Ks)α−1 < (
hT−1
DwT−1
) and (Ks)α−1 < (
rδhT
DwT
)
(at zero work marginal utility of consumption still less than marginal utility of
leisure) so optimally (LT−1, LT ) = (1, 1)
(3) If
(Ks + wT−1)α−1 > (
hT−1
DwT−1
) and (Ks + wT−1)α−1 < (
rδhT
DwT
)
(with full time work in T −1 and zero work at T, at T −1 the marginal utility of
consumption exceeds that of leisure but at T the reverse holds) so (LT−1, LT ) =
(LT−1, LT ) = (0, 1) must be optimal
(4) If
(Ks +
wT
r
)α−1 < (
hT−1
DwT−1
) and (Ks +
wT
r
)α−1 > (
rδhT
DwT
)
(with full time work in T and zero work at T − 1, at T − 1 the marginal utility
of leisure exceeds that of consumption at T − 1, but at T the reverse holds) so
(LT−1, LT ) = (1, 0) must be optimal
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(5) if
Ks < (
rδhT
DwT
)1/(α−1) < Ks +
wT
r
,(
rδhT
wT
) < (
hT−1
wT−1
)
then
LT =
rKs
wT
+ 1− (δhT
D
)1/(α−1)(
r
wT
)α/(α−1)
satisﬁes 0 < LT < 1 and
(Ks +
wT
r
(1− LT ))α−1 < ( hT−1
DwT−1
) ,(Ks +
wT
r
(1− LT ))α−1 = ( rδhT
DwT
)
The optimum is (LT−1, LT ) = (1, rK
s
wT
+ 1− ( δhTD )1/(α−1)( rwT )α/(α−1))
(6) if
Ks + wT−1 < (
rδhT
DwT
)1/(α−1) < Ks + wT−1 +
wT
r
,(
hT−1
wT−1
) < (
rδhT
wT
)
then
LT =
rKs + wT−1
wT
+ 1− (δhT
D
)1/(α−1)(
r
wT
)α/(α−1)
satisﬁes 0 < LT < 1 and
(Ks+wT−1+
wT
r
(1−LT ))α−1 > ( hT−1
DwT−1
) ,(Ks+wT−1+
wT
r
(1−LT ))α−1 = ( rδhT
DwT
)
The optimum is (LT−1, LT ) = (0, rK
s
wT
+ 1− ( δhTD )1/(α−1)( rwT )α/(α−1))
(7) if
Ks < (
hT−1
DwT−1
)1/(α−1) < Ks + wT−1 ,(
hT−1
wT−1
) < (
rδhT
wT
)
then
LT−1 = [Ks + wT−1 − ( hT−1
DwT−1
)1/(α−1)]
1
wT−1
satisﬁes 0 < LT−1 < 1 and
(Ks+wT−1(1−LT−1))α−1 = ( hT−1
DwT−1
) ,(Ks+wT−1(1−LT−1))α−1 < ( rδhT
DwT
)
(8) if
Ks +
wT
r
< (
hT−1
DwT−1
)1/(α−1) < Ks + wT−1 +
wT
r
,(
hT−1
wT−1
) > (
rδhT
wT
)
then
LT−1 = [Ks + wT−1 +
wT
r
− ( hT−1
DwT−1
)1/(α−1)]
1
wT−1
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satisﬁes 0 < LT−1 < 1 and
(Ks+wT−1(1−LT−1)+wT
r
)α−1 = (
hT−1
DwT−1
) ,(Ks+wT−1(1−LT−1)+wT
r
)α−1 > (
rδhT
DwT
)
(9) if ( hT−1wT−1 )
1/(α−1) = ( rδhTDwT )
1/(α−1) and
[Ks + wT−1 +
wT
r
]α−1 < (
hT−1
DwT−1
) < [Ks]α−1
optimally both lesiures are interior and any combination of 0, LT−1, LT < 1 on
the line
wT−1(1− LT−1) + wT
r
(1− LT ) = ( hT−1
DwT−1
)1/(α−1)Ks
are optimal.
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C The Wage Proﬁles Giving Indiﬀerent Partici-
pation Proﬁles
Each pairwise utility combination is deﬁned as follows:
(i) v00 = v01
(Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T )
α = (Ks + rwsT−1)
α +
α
D
δhT
ws,1T =
(
(Ks + rws,1T−1)
α +
α
D
δhT
)1/α
−Ks − rws,1T−1
(ii) v00 = v10
(Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T )
α
α
D =
(Ks +s wT )
α
α
D + hT−1
rws,2T−1 =
(
(Ks + w2T )
α +
α
D
hT−1
)1/α
−Ks − ws,2T
(iii) v00 = v11
(Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T )
α
α
D =
Ks,α
α
D + hT−1 + δhT
rws,3T−1 + w
s,3
T = (K
s,α +
α
D
(hT−1 + δhT ))1/α −Ks
(iv) v01 = v10
(Ks + rw4T−1)
α = (Ks + w4T )
α +
α
D
(hT−1 − δhT )
rws,4T−1 = ((K
s + ws,4T )
α +
α
D
(hT−1 − δhT ))1/α −Ks
(v) v01 = v11
rws,5T−1 = (K
s,α +
α
D
hT−1)1/α −Ks (7)
(vi) v10 = v11
ws,6T = (K
s,α +
α
D
δhT )
1/α −Ks (8)
Where s = nd, d.
For convenience we repeat the indiﬀerence relations here, but setting wages
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on the RHS to zero in order to calculate the relevant wage intercepts
(1) = V s00 − V s01 : ws,1T =
(
Ks,α +
α
D
δhT
)1/α
−Ks
(2) = V s00 − V s10 : rws,2T−1 =
(
Ks,α +
α
D
hT−1
)1/α
−Ks (9)
(3) = V s00 − V s11 : rws,3T−1 + w3T = (Ks,α +
α
D
(hT−1 + δhT ))1/α −Ks
(4) = V s10 − V s01 : rws,4T−1 = (Ks,α +
α
D
(hT−1 − δhT ))1/α −Ks (10)
(5) = V s11 − V s01 : rws,5T−1 = (Ks,α +
α
D
hT−1)1/α −Ks
(6) = V s10 − V s11 : ws,6T = (Ks,α +
α
D
δhT )
1/α −Ks
Comparing the intercept of the loci: those of (1) and (6) are equal as are
those of (2) and (5). But the intercept of locus (1) is below that of locus(3)
on the wsT axis , and of locus (2) is below that of locus (3) on the w
s
T−1 axis.
Combining this information gives Figure 1 in the text.
Comparing the loci we see that for wages such that V s10 = V
s
01 and V
s
00 = V
s
01
we must also have V s00 = V
s
10, in terms of Figure 1 the loci (1), (2) must cross
each other on the locus (4). Similarly the loci (5), (6) (V s11 = V
s
01 and V
s
11 = V
s
10)
must cross on the locus (4) (V s01 = V
s
10). For similar reasons loci (1), (3), (5)
must intersect at a common point; and so must loci (2), (3), (6).
The indiﬀerence relations V s11 = V
s
01, V
s
11 = V
s
10 and V
s
00 = V
s
11 are all linear
in the wage rates with the last being negatively sloped and the other two respec-
tively horizontal and vertical. Relation (4), (1) and (2); V s10 = V
s
01, V
s
00 = V
s
01
and V s00 = V
s
10 respectively are all positively sloped. For example diﬀerentiating
v00 − v01 implicitly
α(Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T )
α−1(rdwsT−1 + dw
s
T ) = α(K
s + rwsT−1)
α−1rdwsT−1
dwsT
dwsT−1
= r
(Ks + rwsT−1)
α−1 − (Ks + rwsT−1 + wsT )α−1
(Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T )
α−1
α < 1 so (Ks+ rwsT−1)
α−1 > (Ks+ rwsT−1+w
s
T )
α−1 and the slope of locus (1)
is always positive at any ws. The same logic applies to locus (2):
α(Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T )
α−1 (rdwsT−1 + dwsT ) = α(Ks + wsT )α−1 (rdwsT )
dwsT
dwsT−1
= r
(
Ks + rwsT−1
)α−1 − (Ks + rwsT−1 + wsT )α−1(
Ks + rwsT−1 + w
s
T
)α−1
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D Comparative statics of the optimal lifecycle
labour participation regimes
In order to ascertain the eﬀect of pension deferral on participation notice that
with the exception of rws,4T−1, the critical wage expressions (as a function of K
s)
all take the form:
ws = ((Ks + ws)α + z)1/α −Ks
where z > 0 is a combination of α, hT−1, hT and D. Note that in cases 7
and 8, z does not depend on s. Diﬀerentiate wrt Ks
dws
dK
= ((Ks + ws)
α
+ z)(1−α)/α(Ks + ws)α−1 − 1
= (1 + z(Ks + ws)−α)(1−α)/α − 1 > 0 if z > 0
In the case of (10) note that on the RHS of the expression we have z =
α
D (hT−1 − δhT ) so if hT−1 > δhT then dw/dK > 0 but if hT−1 < δhT then
dw/dK < 0. So if hT−1 > δhT the wage region with full time work at T expands
at the expense of the wage region with full time work only in T −1.Or vice versa
if hT−1 < δhT .
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